Who Legalized Abortion in 1973

When this requi­re­ment went into effect, Texas went from 42 abor­ti­on cli­nics to just 19. An AMA com­mit­tee on cri­mi­nal abor­ti­on was appoin­ted in May 1857. She pre­sen­ted her report, 12 Trans. by Am.Med.Assn. 778 (1859), for the twelfth annu­al mee­ting. The report said the com­mit­tee had been appoin­ted to inves­ti­ga­te cri­mi­nal abor­ti­ons “with a view to their gene­ral repres­si­on.” She deplo­red abor­ti­on and its fre­quen­cy, citing three cau­ses for “this gene­ral demo­ra­liz­a­ti­on”: A second rea­son con­cerns abor­ti­on as a medi­cal act. When most cri­mi­nal abor­ti­on laws were first enac­ted, the pro­ce­du­re was dan­ge­rous for the woman. [Foot­no­te 43] This was espe­cial­ly true befo­re the ori­gi­nal liti­ga­ti­on, which sought to reopen the case in the U.S. District Court for the U.S. District Court in Texas to over­turn Roe v. Wade. Howe­ver, the Fifth Cir­cuit deci­ded that his case was con­tes­ted, in McCor­vey v. Hügel.

[229] In a con­cur­ring opi­ni­on, Jus­ti­ce Edith Jones agreed that McCor­vey rai­ses legi­ti­ma­te ques­ti­ons about the emo­tio­nal and other harms suf­fe­red by women who have had abor­ti­ons, the incre­a­se in resour­ces avail­ab­le to care for unwan­ted child­ren, and a new sci­en­ti­fic under­stan­ding of fetal deve­lo­p­ment. Howe­ver, Jones said she was for­ced to accept that the case was con­tro­ver­si­al. [230] [231] On Febru­a­ry 22, 2005, the Supre­me Court refu­sed to issue a cer­ti­fi­ca­te and McCorvey‘s appeal ended. [232] Roe was sup­por­ted by Pre­si­dents Bill Clinton[346] and Barack Oba­ma. [347] In 1981, Sena­tor Joe Biden voted in favor of a con­sti­tu­tio­nal amend­ment allowing sta­tes to annul Roe v. Wade, whom he voted against the fol­lowing year. [348] In his 2007 memoi­rs, Biden expres­sed the view that while he was “per­so­nal­ly oppo­sed to abor­ti­on,” he did not have the “right to impo­se his per­so­nal oppo­si­ti­on on others.” [349] In 2021, he descri­bed hims­elf to repor­ters as “a strong sup­por­ter of Roe v. Wade,” adding, “And I unde­re­sti­ma­te – I respect peop­le who think this – who don‘t sup­port Roe v. Wade; I respect their point of view. I respect them – tho­se who belie­ve that life begins at the moment of con­cep­ti­on and ever­ything. I respect that. I dis­agree, but I respect that.

I‘m not going to impo­se that on peop­le. [350] [351] When mem­bers ques­tio­ned the poli­ti­cal uti­li­ty of the rhe­to­ric of popu­la­ti­on con­trol, the abor­ti­on rights move­ment distanced its­elf from the popu­la­ti­on con­trol move­ment. [152] In Octo­ber 1973, Robin Elliott dis­tri­bu­t­ed a memo to other mem­bers of Plan­ned Paren­t­hood regar­ding oppo­si­ti­on to “Plan­ned Parenthood‘s credi­bi­li­ty with respect to the popu­la­ti­on pro­blem.” [152] Ins­tead, she thought they should use Roe-inspi­red rhe­to­ric about “reaf­fir­ming the com­mit­ment to free­dom of choice in paren­ting.” [152] In 1978, a NARAL manu­al denoun­ced popu­la­ti­on con­trol. [153] “In abor­ti­on cases, as in any other medi­cal pro­ce­du­re, the Coun­cil of the Judi­cia­ry is cal­led upon in cases of alle­ged vio­la­ti­on of the princi­ples of medi­cal ethics as estab­lis­hed by the Cham­ber of Depu­ties.” In Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535 (D.S.C. 1977), South Caro­li­na attemp­ted to sue a doc­tor for ille­gal abor­ti­on and mur­der after attemp­t­ing to abort an Afri­can-Ame­ri­can boy at 25 weeks. During the abor­ti­on, the boy was born ali­ve and sur­vi­ved 20 days befo­re his death. [271] His indict­ment was blo­cked by Judge Cle­ment Hayns­worth and short­ly the­re­af­ter by a unani­mous three-judge panel of the United Sta­tes District Court for the District of South Caro­li­na. Judge Hayns­worth, wri­ting for the panel, said, “In fact, the Supre­me Court has decla­red that the fetus in the womb is neit­her ali­ve nor a per­son wit­hin the mea­ning of the Four­te­enth Amend­ment.” [272] John T. Noo­n­an cri­ti­ci­zed this from an anti-abor­ti­on per­spec­ti­ve, sta­ting that “Jus­ti­ce Hayns­worth had inde­fi­ni­te­ly repla­ced the Supre­me Court‘s test of poten­ti­al via­bi­li­ty with a new test of actu­al viability.

He also exp­lai­ned the impli­ca­ti­ons of Roe v. Wade but never real­ly said the­re. For U.S. legal sys­tems, the fetus was not ali­ve in the womb. [273] Roe‘s stan­dard of via­bi­li­ty out­side the womb requi­red an “abi­li­ty to live mea­ning­ful­ly.” [274] Without this capa­ci­ty, the sta­te has no “com­pel­ling important and legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in poten­ti­al life.” [274] “E. Con­tracep­ti­on and/or ste­ri­liz­a­ti­on should be dis­cus­sed with any pati­ent who has had an abor­ti­on. The court divi­ded the pregnan­cy into three tri­mes­ters, sta­ting that the decisi­on to ter­mi­na­te a pregnan­cy in the first tri­mes­ter res­ted sole­ly with the woman. In the second tri­mes­ter, the government could regu­la­te abor­ti­on but not ban it to pro­tect mater­nal health. (a) For the sta­ge befo­re the end of the first tri­mes­ter appro­xi­mate­ly, the decisi­on to ter­mi­na­te the pregnan­cy and its exe­cu­ti­on should be left to the medi­cal dis­cre­ti­on of the pregnant woman‘s atten­ding physician.

pp. 163–164. A Texas-style abor­ti­on law in the sta­te, which exempts only a res­cue pro­cee­ding on behalf of the mother, regard­less of the sta­ge of pregnan­cy and without reco­gni­ti­on of other inte­rests at sta­ke, vio­la­tes the due pro­cess clau­se of the Four­te­enth Amend­ment. Des­pi­te all the attacks on abor­ti­on rights, the Supre­me Court had – until now – the fun­da­men­tal princip­le of Roe v. Wade: The Con­sti­tu­ti­on pro­tects a person‘s right to make their own pri­va­te medi­cal decisi­ons, inclu­ding the decisi­on to per­form an abor­ti­on befo­re the fetus‘ via­bi­li­ty is via­ble. The court has hono­red this princip­le by making decisi­ons in major abor­ti­on law cases, inclu­ding Plan­ned Paren­t­hood of Sou­the­as­tern Penn­syl­va­nia v. Casey and Who­le Woman‘s Health v. Hel­ler­stedt. With regard to the important and legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest of the sta­te in a poten­ti­al life, the “impe­ra­ti­ve” point is via­bi­li­ty. This is becau­se the fetus then pro­bab­ly has the abi­li­ty to live signi­fi­cant­ly out­side the womb.

Sta­te regu­la­ti­ons that pro­tect the life of the fetus after via­bi­li­ty the­re­fo­re have both logi­cal and bio­lo­gi­cal jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­ons. If the sta­te is inte­res­ted in pro­tec­ting the life of the fetus after via­bi­li­ty, it can go so far as to pro­hi­bit abor­ti­on. By this time, Black and Har­lan had been repla­ced by Wil­liam Rehn­quist and Lewis F. Powell Jr., but the first dis­pu­te had alrea­dy taken place befo­re they beca­me Supre­me Court jus­ti­ces. [90] Jus­ti­ce Black­mun worked on a preli­mi­na­ry advi­so­ry opi­ni­on for Roe, arguing that the Texas law was uncon­sti­tu­tio­nal­ly vague. [88] This approach respon­ded to the asser­ti­ons of some phy­si­ci­ans that pro­se­cu­tors would dis­agree with them on what con­sti­tu­tes “life.” Black­mun thought this approach would be a good way to avoid the con­tro­ver­sy that would accom­pa­ny the state­ment that the­re was a fun­da­men­tal right to abor­ti­on. Brenn­an and Dou­glas dis­agreed with Black­mun and wro­te to him that he should focus on pri­va­cy ins­tead. [91] After com­mu­ni­ca­ting with the other jud­ges, Black­mun felt that his opi­ni­on did not ade­qua­te­ly reflect that of his Libe­ral col­leagues. [90] In March 1972, the Court ren­de­red judgment in Eisen­stadt v.

Baird, a land­mark case that now app­lied for­mer mar­i­tal inti­ma­cy to unmar­ried peop­le. [92] In the 1960s, the­re was an alli­an­ce bet­ween the popu­la­ti­on con­trol move­ment and the abor­ti­on rights move­ment in the United Sta­tes. [140] Abor­ti­on rights were par­ti­cu­lar­ly sup­por­ted by young women wit­hin the popu­la­ti­on con­trol move­ment. [141] The col­la­bo­ra­ti­on was lar­ge­ly due to femi­nists who wan­ted some of the popu­la­ri­ty alrea­dy enjoy­ed by the popu­la­ti­on con­trol move­ment. Moreo­ver, advo­ca­tes of popu­la­ti­on con­trol belie­ved that lega­li­zing abor­ti­on would help sol­ve the com­ing demo­gra­phic cri­sis that demo­graph­ers had fore­se­en. [140] The Supre­me Court requi­red the sta­te to jus­ti­fy any inter­fe­rence with the right of access to abor­ti­on by showing that it had a “com­pel­ling inte­rest” and ruled that no inte­rest was com­pel­ling enough to pro­hi­bit abor­ti­on befo­re it was viable.